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On the Dialogue on the Invariable Concomitance in *Vijñ?nak?ya 
TOBITA Yasuhiro 
 
The objectives of this paper are two: one is to elucidate the question whether or not the invariable 
concomitance (i.e., what is observed is always concomitant with what is existent; namely, what is 
observed is always existent) utilized by the proponent (the Sarv?stiv?din) in the proof of existence in 
the past, [at present,] and in the future (i.e., the past and future source of evil, the greed, is existent 
because it is observed) in *Vijñ?nak?ya ????????????without his opponent’s consent is 
acceptable to his opponent, and the other objective is to elucidate the question how the proponent can 
persuade his opponent into accepting the invariable concomitance, provided that his opponent does not 
own the invariable concomitance.  
The method is to analyze and examine the only counterargument by the opponent and the 
confutation by the proponent against it in *Vijñ?nak?ya in order to clarify the following circumstances 
in this dialogue.  
First of all, in demonstrating what is existent in the past, [at present,] and in the future, the 
proponent tacitly utilizes the invariable concomitance that what is observed is always existent.  
Secondly, however, the opponent rejects the invariable concomitance itself. Because the opponent, 
who asserts that things in the past and the future are not existent, supposes that things in the past and 
the future are observed but are not existent, he rejects the reason (“because it is observed”) adduced by 
the proponent as uncertain (which later Buddhist logicians called anaik?ntikahetu) because the reason 
does not always deduce the conclusion (“[it] is existent”). Therefore, indicating this reasoning error to 
the proponent, the opponent claims “[the consciousness of the things in the past and the future does not 
possess the objects because the things that should be the objects of the consciousness are not existent. 
Hence, some] consciousness does not possess the object.”  
Then, thirdly, in order to confute this opponent’s counterargument, the proponent introduces the 
relationship between agent (kart?) and object of action (karman) into his discussion. Namely, the 
proponent suggests his opponent a traditional doctrine (?gama), which denotes that the agent of 
perception (consciousness) always possesses the object of perception (the object of consciousness), 
which the opponent accepts. As a result, the opponent faces with the dilemma: insofar as he claims that 
[some] consciousness does not the object, he cannot accept this traditional doctrine, while insofar as he 
accepts this traditional doctrine, he cannot claim so.  
Fourthly, however, the opponent again claims that the consciousness possessing the object in the 
past and the future does not possess the objet, which is apparently harmonic to the traditional doctrine. 
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However, his interpretation has a slightly revised connotation that the consciousness possessing the 
[actually non-existent] object in the past and the future does not possess the [actually existent] object.  
Finally, in confutation against this interpretation, the proponent suggests his opponent the 
relationship between cause and effect concealed in the relationship between the object of consciousness 
and consciousness. Namely, the [actually existent] cause, i.e., the object of consciousness, engenders 
the result, i.e., the consciousness. Therefore, when the result (i.e., consciousness) is existent, the 
[actually existent] cause, (i.e., the object of consciousness) is always existent. In other words, 
consciousness always possesses the [actually existent] object. As a result, the opponent cannot persist in 
his interpretation of the traditional doctrine by slightly revising his claim. 
 
 
About the Definition of ?lambana in ?lambanapar?k?? 
ITO Yasuhiro 
 
As well known, Dign?ga (ca. 480-540) discusses the thesis of the cognized objects (?lambana) in 
?lambanapar?k??. In this work he specifies two conditions which the cognizable objects should fulfill. 
The cognizable objects for certain knowledge must fulfill conditions that they consist of the 
source of the knowledge and have the same images (?k?ra) as the knowledge. 
These conditions are reasonably supported by the theory of s?k?rav?da, which states that 
knowledge is endowed with the image of its object and position. However Dign?ga proves the statement 
scrupulously and thereby develops the argument leading to the conclusion that the theory of 
"cognition-only" (vijñaptim?trav?da) is drawn inevitably.  
This paper aims to interpret the text in detail based on notes, add logical analysis and 
consideration in terms of the above contents and thereby clarify the definition of cognized objects 
(?lambana) bibliographically. 
 
 
Dharmottara’s Understandings of Mental Perception (m?nasa) 
HAYASHI Keijin 
 
Dharmottara, a commentator on Dharmak?rti’s works, is the first scholar that shows a special 
attitude toward mental perception. He says that the existence of mental perception is allowed only from 
